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JURISDICTION
Philip C. Jessup
I think in approaching the subject of
Jurisdiction it is pertinent to note that
anyone exercising authority of the
United States Government is from time
to time necessarily concerned with
problems of jurisdiction. Within the
limits of authority entrusted to you,
where can you exercise that authority,
over whom, with respect to what
actions or events? And, reciprocally,
what are the limits of the power and
rightful authority of the representative,
or officer, of another government with
respect to you, your ship, or personnel
under your command?
I think that we are concerned particularly with the exercise of power, or
authority, or jurisdiction at sea, and
over ships and persons on ships. But,
first, we need to get some general
propositions in mind. I think it may be
convenient for you ifI suggest the order
in which I intend to take up various
topics.
First, some general observations on
the nature of jurisdiction and what that
means; second, the international law
limits on jurisdiction; third, the general
bases of jurisdiction which are accepted
in international law; fourth, passing
from there, to exceptions or immunities
to normal jurisdiction; fifth, taking up
specifically jurisdiction over persons;
and, sixth, jurisdiction over places. Our
consideration of jurisdiction over places
leads us to a consideration of territorial

waters and jurisdiction on the high
seas-including, particularly, the problems arising in contiguous waters, including the continental shelf. Then, I
shall pass back to some specific considerations of jurisdiction over shipsincluding ships in port, in territorial
waters, and on the high seas. Finally, I
shall deal with the question of jurisdiction within the air space.
First, then, as to a general idea of the
nature of jurisdiction, or what it means.
It has frequently been explained as "the
power to speak the law," to tell what
the law is, what law or rule applies to
whom, in what place, and in regard to
what acts or events. We have the same
problem within our domestic organizational systems. We have problems of
jurisdiction as to the Town of Newport,
the State of Rhode Island, and the
Federal authorities, in regard to various
events which may happen in this immediate community.
I thilik, also, that you may look at
jurisdiction in terms of the three
branches of Government which exercise
it. First, one speaks of legislative jurisdiction, which is the power of the
Congress to lay down a rule. For instance, Congress passed a law prohibiting the transportation of liquor in
American territory during the era of the
Eighteenth Amendment. Second, you
have judicial jurisdiction, which is the
power of the court to determine what
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are the rights or liabilities. For instance,
the court entertains a libel of a ship
seized for bootlegging and imposes a
fine, or other penalty, if it finds that the
statute has been violated. In the third
place you have executive jurisdiction;
that is, the power of the Executive
Branch of the Government to carry out
the law and to provide its impact upon
the individual or thing. For examplehere, again, keeping within the realm of
the prohibition laws for a convenient
example-the Coast Guard seizes a ship
hovering off the United States coast
with intent to smuggle alcoholic liquors
into the United States.
Granted that these three branches of
Government may exercise jurisdiction,
international law has developed principles which limit the power. I think the
reason that has been true, historically, is
that nations have recognized that it is
c~nvenient for every government to act
on the same matter at the same time,
although we will see that in many
instances jurisdictions do overlap. This
means that if a state exercises its power
-that is, takes jurisdiction-under circumstances which international law considers proper, other states have no right
to protest. If they do protest and the
matter is submitted to international
adjudication, an international court will
hold that no damages are due.
One might point out, as an illustration here, a case which I will have
occasion to refer to again in other
connections, one which has become a
very famous case, the Steamship Lotus.
The French ship Lotus collided negligently with the Turkish ship Bozkourt
on the high seas in the Mediterranean.
Lotus, the French ship, later put in to a
Turkish port. The Turks arrested the
mate in command of the French ship at
the time the collision took place and
were going to try him for the death of
the Turkish citizens who were killed in
the collision. The French protested that
the Turks had no jurisdiction in such a
situation, and the two countries agreed

to refer it to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, to answer the
specific question: Did Turkey violate
any of the rules of international law
regarding the proper exercise of jurisdiction by a state when it asserted its
authority to try Lieutenant Demons for
the alleged crime of killing the Turkish
citizens on this ship?
In addition to these general principles of international law governing
jurisdiction, you have also many particular treaties which define jurisdiction,
as in the old days we had special treaties
providing for our extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, and under the eapitulations in Turkey and elsewhere. We have
special treaty agreements in regard to
jurisdiction governing our forces stationed abroad under the Status of
Forces Agreements, or our arrangements
in particular bases which we have leased
from other countries.
Granted that you have this domestic
power to exercise your jurisdiction, and
granted that you have certain rules of
international law which determine the
proper limits of the exercise of that
power when questions are raised in our
courts-that is, in American national
courts-where the issue is posed that the
jurisdiction exercised by the United
States is in violation of a rule of
international law, the American courts
must follow the legislative command if
the Congress has laid down clearly a rule
which is to be applied. But the courts
have developed the principle that they
will always assume that Congress did
not intend to violate international law,
and, therefore, if the statute can be
reconciled with the international principle the courts will adopt the interpretation which is in accord with internationallaw.
For example, a few years ago a case
before the Supreme Court involved a
statute which in general terms provided
that any seaman suffering certain accidents, would have certain remedies. The
question was whether a Danish seaman
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serving on a Danish ship while that ship
was in the Havana harbor could take
advantage of that statute when the ship
later called at New York. Then the
Supreme Court said: "No, Congress
clearly did not intend when it said 'any
seaman' to mean any seaman on any
ship anywhere in the world. They had in
mind the normal limitations which have
developed in the historical evolution of
maritime law." So they placed an interpretation on the statute to bring it into
accord with international law.
It is also true that the executive has
in certain circumstances the authority
under our Constituional form of government to make the action of the United
States comply. with the international
rule, even though the original law
enforcement officer is quite properly
acting within the authority of the
jurisdictional power laid down by
Congress.
For example-again, in the prohibition cases-the Coast Guard arrested
several foreign ships which were smuggling, or intending to smuggle, liquor
into the United States. They were
authorized to do so under the Act of
Congress. But the foreign governments
protested and said: "You cannot seize
our ships in that place under those
circumstances." The President, exercising his executive authority, ordered
the Attorney General not to prosecute
the ships, but to release them. Therefore, there was no further enforcement
of the laws against those particular
ships.
Similarly where, under our draft
laws, aliens were drafted into the Army
and where under the statute the draft
board had no option but to force the
aliens into the Armed Forces-when the
foreign governments protested on particular grounds, the President discharged
the individuals from the Armed Forces.
So you get a reconciliation at timesnot always-between the power of the
United States to exercise jurisdiction in
its territory and the rule of international

law, which places certain limits on that
power.
In international practice several legal
bases of jurisdiction have been developed. The first of these is clearly accepted by everybody: that is the territorial basis of jurisdiction, which is the
simple proposition that the United
States laws apply in the United States.
This is universally accepted throughout
the world and it is the basic system
adopted in the law of the United States,
of England, and of many other countries.
Next, there is the personal theory of
jurisdiction: the theory that you may
exercise your power over your own
citizens. It is based on nationality, or
the links between the individual and the
state. This is universally recognized in
international law as a proper basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction. Some of the
laws of the United States apply to
American citizens abroad, but it is the
secondary basis in our law; in other
countries it is the primary basis. In
Italy, for instance, the personal theory
of jurisdiction is preferred as the basic
system over even the territorial system.
Third, there is what is known as the
protective theory of jurisdiction, which
I think is clearly accepted in international law but which has a limited
scope. What that means is that a state
may exercise its jurisdiction even over a
person who is not a citizen, and even
though the act is not committed in the
United States, if the act is one directed
against and affecting particular interests
of the United States. For instance: we
have a statute which punishes any alien
who commits perjury in applying for a
visa before an American consular officer
in a foreign country. Here is a situation
of a Frenchman, we will say, in France
committing an act before an American
consul The basis of our jurisdiction is
the fact that our interest in having our
documents properly issued is affected.
Many other countries apply that principle even more widely.
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There is also the so-called "passive
personality theory." This is not universally accepted in international law and
has always been challenged by the
United States. The theory here is that
you exercise your jurisdiction on the
basis of the nationality of the person
who is injured-not the nationality of
the criminal, but the nationality of the
victim. For example, under the Turkish
law if anyone injures a Turkish citizen
anywhere in the world Turkey asserts
the right to punish that individual for
having injured a Turk. In the Lotus case,
for example, one subsidiary element was
the Turkish criminal statute which said:
"We may punish anyone who injures a
Turk. This master of the French ship
has injured a Turk on the high seas;
.therefore, we may punish him." That
was one of the bases on which the Turks
alleged their right to exercise jurisdiction. The court decided the case on
other grounds, but this factor was
brought up.
Then there is a very famous earlier
case in United States history of a
conflict with Mexico, where Mexico had
a similar criminal statute authorizing the
punishment of anyone who injured a
Mexican. In this case they tried and
prosecuted an American citizen who
had published a libel, defaming a Mexican citizen. I need not go into the
various complexities of the case, but in
that situation the United States strongly
resisted the Mexican claim that they
could exercise jurisdiction over an alien
for an act performed outside of Mexican
territory solely on the ground that the
individual affected was a Mexican citizen.
Finally, there is what is called the
"universality theory," which, again, is
of limited acceptance in international
law. I think that the only clear case of
its application is in connection with
piracy; that is, that any nation is
privileged to try, prosecute, and punish
a person guilty of piracy. But you do
find some countries-again, Italy as an

example-who take the position that if a
crime has been committed anywhere in
the world, anyone who catches the
offender ought to be able to punish him
so as to be sure that he does not escape
justice. In most countries where that
theory is accepted, it is hedged around
with various limitations: such as the fact
that no other country wishes to exercise
a jurisdiction on the territorial principle,
or on the personal principle, or on the
proteetive principle, or any other principles; and that this is merely a catchall to
prevent the possibility of a criminal
escaping trial. The theory of it is that it
is based merely on the custody of the
offe~der; if you have him within your
physical power, you ought to be able to
try him.
In addition to its application to
piracy, this theory may have a useful
application in those relatively restricted
areas of the earth's surface which are
not now under the sovereignty of any
state-for instance, in Antarctica. But
actually there, if it became a question of
the application of some jurisdictional
principle, a case could probably be
handled on the basis of the personal
theory of jurisdiction.
There are one or two special applications of the territorial principle which I
want to mention. First, where an act is
performed outside the territory and
takes effect inside the territory; for
instance, if a Mexican standing on the
Mexican side of our frontier shoots
across the border and kills an American
in the United States, we assert the right
to exercise our jurisdiction on the territorial principle. Although the murderer
was not in the United States, nevertheless his act takes effect in the United
States. Again, that was one of the bases
of the decision of the International
Court in the Lotus case; namely, that
the act set in motion on the French ship
through negligent navigation took effect
on the Turkish ship, resulting in the
injury to Turks on the Turkish ship. As
we will see, a ship is for certain purposes
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assimilated to territory; therefore, the
Turks said that even on the territorial
principle they were entitled to take
jurisdiction because the act took effect
on their ship, which was assimilated to
their territory.
Just as a footnote on that, the
maritime community did not at all like
the principle that the officer of a ship
causing a collision of this kind should be
tried in any port where his ship later
came in. They felt that jurisdiction
should be exercised only by the flag
state; that is, by the state whose flag the
vessel was flying of which the officer
was in command. In 1952, a number of
maritime states drew up a treaty at
Brussels, providing that in the future
they would agree that in such collision
cases jurisdiction would be exercised
only by the flag state. That rule in the
Brussels Convention is now recommended by the International Law Commission of the United Nations for universal adoption, but this is a matter for
treaty agreement
The second special application of the
territorial principle is merely the reverse
situation: where a person inside the
territory puts into motion a force which
results in injury outside the territory.
For example, Brazil punished a man
who put a time bomb on a British ship
when that ship was in a Brazilian port,
although the time bomb did not go off
until the ship was on the high seas. But
the Brazilians said: "The putting of the
bomb on the ship in our territory,
though the act took effect outside, gives
us jurisdiction on the territorial
theory. "
Along with these general bases of
jurisdiction, there are certain exceptions, or immunities. For instance, our
laws are not enforced against foreign
ambassadors, or in a foreign embassy, or
in the headquarters of the United
Nations. Our laws are not enforced
against a foreign warship in a United
States port These are exceptions
stemming from international law.

Similarly, our laws are not enforced
against a foreign state, or against its
instrumentality, subject to certain exceptions which I shall not go into.
A further exception found in international law is the exception of distress.
When a vessel comes into territorial
waters or into a foreign port in distress,
being forced in by damaged machinery,
a shortage of provisions or water, or
various things of that kind, the local
state is not entitled under international
law to exercise the jurisdiction which
would normally be attached. As we shall
see in more detail later, when a ship is
passing in innocent passage through
foreign territorial waters the jurisdiction
of the local state which normally
attaches is limited.
Now a word on what is included in
the territory over which a state has
jurisdiction. For instance, in regard to
the United States-what are the places
where the United States exercises this
power without valid international objection? Clearly, all the land area of the
United States and the islands belonging
to it, its inland waters, lakes, and rivers
within our frontiers; the territorial
waters along our coast (we will define
these later); the air space above this land
and these waters; similarly, now, by a
special arrangement, the trust territories
which are placed under our control and
bases over which we exercise jurisdiction under certain treaties; and then, as
I have indicated, by a fiction, international law accepts the idea that every
state exercises what is called "territorial
jurisdiction" over its ships, wherever
they may be. Courts do not like that
fiction-they would rather explain the
rule in different ways. For instance: the
Supreme Court said that the national
Prohibition Act, which forbids the
carrying of liquors in American territory, was not applicable to the carriage
of liquors on an American ship on the
high seas-they would not push the
fiction of territoriality that far. Then
another court pointed out, to reduce it
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to an absurdity, that no one contended
as a ship sailed across the high seas it
was surrounded by a belt of territorial
waters as it moved from one continent
to another. The "territorial jurisdiction"
theory has a limited utility-in history,
at least-in extending jurisdiction over
ships.
Who are included in the persons over
whom we have jurisdiction when they
, are not in our territory? Under our law
such jurisdiction is limited to our citizens, or the nationals of the United
States; to American corporations; and,
in some cases, to seamen serving on
American ships, even where they do not
have American nationality.
Clearly, as I suggested before, there
are cases of proper dual or multiple
jurisdiction. For instance: if an Italian
commits murder in the United States,
the United States has jurisdiction on the
territorial theory and Italy has jurisdiction on the personal theory. You can
multiply the complexities. If the murderer has dual nationality-for instance,
he may be both an Italian and a
Greek-you may add another state
which has jurisdiction on the personal
theory. Similarly, if a crime is committed on a United States ship in a
British port there is a duality of territory, so to speak: it being in a British
port, the British have jurisdiction under
the territorial theory; it being on an
American ship, the United States may
validly exercise its jurisdiction on the
theory that the act was committed on
the American ship.
In general in these cases of dual
jurisdiction you can say that he who
has, gets; that is, the man will probably
be tried where he is caught. That state
will have precedence because the police
of one state can not exercise their
authority in another state. On the other
hand, in certain situations the criminal
may be transferred from the state where
he is apprehended to another state
which has a basis for trying him through
the process known as "extradition." We

might just note in passing that where
the individual is not in your territory
and you do not actually have him in
your physical power, you can nevertheless proceed against him and exercise
your jurisdiction on the personal theory
by controlling his property. So under
one of our statutes a man named Blackmer, who was wanted in the United
States under a statute requiring people
to testify in certain government proceedings-and where he refused to
come-was fined by the American
courts $60,000, which was collected out
of his property in the United States. So
even though you do not have the man,
in your power there are ways in which
you can punish him and influence his
conduct.
I have been talking generally about
criminal jurisdiction. The problem of
civil jurisdiction is one in which international law leaves to each state a much
wider and freer choice. For instance,
our courts may deal with the contracts
made between two Frenchmen in
France in regard to conduct to be
performed in France. Under our law,
the question of our civil jurisdiction
depends usually on the service of a
summons or the attachment of property
which is completed within our jurisdiction. In the admiralty field in suits
against a ship, you can follow the ship
allover the world and wherever the ship
comes in you may proceed in a civil suit
against that particular vessel. Without
going into more of the details on those
questions of civil jurisdiction, let me
return to the problem of territorial
jurisdiction to point out one other
aspect of the situation.
In general there is no problem in
determining which land territory is subject to which state, but you do have
disputed frontiers. Therefore, you may
have a border area in which it is not
clear which state exercises jurisdiction
lawfully under international law. We are
seeing that at the moment in the new
flare-up of the border dispute between
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Ecuador and Peru. Many other cases will
occur to you. Even in recent times there
are disputes as to the fundamental title
to a particular territory. These titles are
frequently adjudicated in international
courts, as we adjudicated with the
Netherlands the sovereignty over, or
title to, the small island of Palm as in the
Philippine Archipelago; as Norway and
Denmark arbitrated sovereignty over
eastern Greenland; and, just recently, as
France and England have submitted to
the International Court jurisdiction over
some small islands in the English Channel, which the court decided belonged
to England. At present, the main area of
disputed sovereignty is Antarctica,
where the United States does not recognize any of the numerous claims which
have been asserted by a group of states.
But the real problem in determining
what is the territorial jurisdiction comes
up when you get to territorial waters.
The problem of territorial waters arises,
historically, at a period in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries when nations
were claiming vast areas of the high seas
and saying: "These are ours"-and
these claims were being resisted. Gradually, it narrowed down to the idea that
it was perfectly reasonable to have a
certain belt of water around our coast
for the purpose of protecting our interests, even though we now admit that the
high seas arc free and common to
everybody. So, developing in the seventcentll and eighteenth centuries, there
began to crystallize the rule of territorial waters.
It has long been asserted that the
tllree-mile rule-which is the rule that
the United States now supports and has
always supported-was based on the
range of cannon in the eighteenth century, when the three-mile rule began to
take shape. I think that recent historical
searches have shown that that was not
the origin. But in any case this proved
to be a reasonable limit, and so it came
to have a very general acceptance for a
time. One thing was clear-and still is

clear-that everyone agrees, and that all
countries agree, that there is really a
territorial sea and that this territorial sea
is part of your territory just as much as
your land area. But there is much
disagreement now as to where the territorial sea ends and the high seas begin.
Since the national frontier, or boundary, ends not on the low-water mark of
the coast but at some point out in the
sea, at the edge of your territorial
waters, and since the boundaries of
territorial waters are now in dispute,
you have in a sense a disputed frontier
for every maritime state because not
everyone agrees as to the point at which
that frontier is to be drawn on the high
seas parallel to the coast.
Before discussing the exact nature of
the boundaries, we should note that not
all jurisdiction stops at this maritime
frontier-that is, at the edge of territorial waters-the way it stops at a land
frontier. It is clear when you go to the
Canadian or Mexican boundaries that
you have ended the territory of the
United States, gotten into another territory, and that territorial jurisdiction
stops. But when you get out to the edge
of territorial waters and get on the high
seas, international law does not say that
all your jurisdiction stops because it is
agreed that there are certain types of
jurisdiction which you may exercise on
the high seas. We will see that the state
may have a larger claim to jurisdiction
in the high seas adjacent to its territorial
waters, although outside them.
Going back to this question of the
boundaries between territorial waters
and the high seas, the United States has
from the beginning of its history accepted the three-mile rule. So has England and a very large portion of the
great maritime powers. The logic of the
United States argument, today, is
clear because as you go out from shore
you get out one mile and say: "Under international law is this clearly
U.S. territory?"-and everybody says:
"Yes. "
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You go out two miles and say: "Is
this U.S. territory?"-and everybody
says: "Yes."
You go out 2.9 miles and say: "Is
this U.S. territory?"-again, universal
agreement: "Yes."
But you get out to 3.5 miles and say:
"Is this U.S. territory?"-immediately,
you get a divergence of opinion among
the governments of the world.
So up to three miles it is universally
agreed that you are in territorial waters.
When you pass beyond the three-mile
limit, you begin to get into an area of
disagreement This disagreement goes
back a long way. For instance, the
Russian twelve-mile claim goes back to
about 1911, and was vigorously opposed in the early period by Japan and
the United Kingdom particularly. In
1921, for instance, a British trawler was
seized by the Russians ten miles out
from the Russian coast. A British warship was sent to the waters off
Archangel. According to a statement by
the British Government in the House of
Commons, it was sent there for fishery
protection duties-"Our orders are to
prevent interference with British vessels
outside the three-mile limit, using force
if necessary." The Soviet Government
has had an agreement with Great
Britain, a treaty agreement, allowing
British ships to fish up to three miles
from the Russian coast-but the Soviets
have now given notice that they are not
going to continue that agreement.
You have many of these disputes.
You have the dispute currently between
Japan and Korea, where Korea has
drawn the so-called "Syngman Rhee
Line," extending in many cases one
hundred miles off the Korean coast. By
the end of 1953, the official Japanese
report was that the Koreans had
arrested 142 Japanese fishing vessels and
1,788 Japanese fishermen for trespassing on what the Koreans assert are
Korean waters and which the Japanese,
following our same rule of the threemile limit, insist are the high seas.

The International Law Commission
of the United Nations has been trying to
grapple with this problem and see if
they could find an agreement. They
have finally come up this year with the
suggestion that international law does
not require recognition more than three
miles out, but that any state (they
suggest) should be privileged to set its
territorial waters as far out as twelve
miles. This is frankly advanced still as a
matter of suggestion, without any
assurance of agreement.
Meanwhile you will find, for instance, that on the west coast of South
America, Chile, Peru and Ecuador have
all adopted rules claiming two hundred
miles off their coasts, and they have
concluded a treaty among themselves
agreeing that they will maintain this
rule.
The Scandinavian countries have a
special situation, in which they traditionally claim four miles. But, here, one
might note that there is in the literature
a good deal of confusion about the
length of a mile. For instance, the
Norwegian order of 1906 speaks of the
ordinary sea mile as 7,529 meters, or
4,065 mean nautical miles, or .468
statute miles. A good deal of the confusion about the Scandinavian claims
has been due to a different terminology.
We find, however, that Norway has set
up a special claim to the measurement
of waters, based on the particular configuration of its coast.
In general, it is the big maritime
powers that have stuck by the threemile limit. They are the ones that
control the high seas in a sense, and,
therefore, the wider the high seas the
larger the area in which they exercise a
certain control through their maritime
power; whereas the weak maritime
powers are naturally interested in having
the widest possible belt of territorial
waters in which their national authority
will be recognized.
This issue has been particularly acute
in connection with fisheries. Here, the
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United States has a mixed interest. We
have important fisheries off our own
eoasts from whieh we want to exclude
foreigners. But we also have important
fishing interests off foreign eoasts-off
Mexieo, off Peru, and off Canada-and
we are interested in having our fishermen get as close as possible to those
coasts. The answer in international practice is frequently through special treaty
agreements.
But fisheries are not the only interest
for which you need the rule of territorial waters. You must protect yourself
against smuggling, against hostile forces,
and in earlier days-particularly in the
historical development of the United
States-the emphasis was upon the enforcement of our neutrality laws and
our neutral duties in time of war.
We will also see later that since the
territorial claim includes the air over
territorial waters, we now need to consider whether three miles of air space
off our coast is satisfactory. I think that
generally, the situation is one in which
for a long time, an old rule met the
needs of the international community,
but does not seem to do so now. I am
inclined to think that if the question
went to the International Court of
Justice in a broad form today that they
would be inclined to uphold a claim of
six, ten, or twelve miles if that claim
had been asserted over a reasonable
period of time. But I doubt very much
if they would support the two-hundredmile claim of the countries on the west
coast of South America.
The State Department, however, is
still very clear in maintaining its insistence on the three-mile limit. For
instance, they asserted this claim very
emphatically to the Soviet government
when, in 1953, the Soviets shot down a
B-50 off Cape Povorotny. We insisted
that the three-mile limit was the only
limit that we were bound to accept,
although we were warning our aviators
to stay at least twelve miles off the
Soviet coast.

But in any case, let me repeat,
somewhere there is a line between territorial waters and the high seas. I have
been talking about the difficulty of
measuring the boundary between the
territorial waters and the high seas
themselves. There is another problem
of measuring the point at which you
begin, and I think that we can
perhaps see that by looking at
several illustrations.
The general agreement has been in
the past that you start at a low-water
mark and that you carry your three-mile
limit in a line parallel to the low-water
mark-in our case, three miles from the
coast. I am going to call your attention
to the fact that we have the twelve-mile
limit of customs waters; we have the air
zone (which I shall come to later); and
then we have the further sixty-toninety-mile customs enforcement zone.
Our general position had heen to draw
the three-mile limit parallel to the coast.
(See plate one)
On the other hand in Norway, wher:e
there was a peculiar configuration of
many little rocky islets and deep fjords
indenting the coast, the Norwegian insisted that you could not have a line
which moved in and out from all of
these little minute points; that they
were entitled to draw a general hase
line, connecting the points shown by
the dotted line there. Then you measure
your territorial waters four miles out
from the hase line (in their case, under
their historic claim, four rather than
three miles) rather than from the lowwater mark. The Norwegian claim was
contested by England and submitted to
the International Court of Justice,
which decided that under the particular
circumstances of the case the Norwegian
claim was sound in international law.
(See plate two)
Iceland, which has had a long, tough
struggle to preserve its fishing industry-particularly against the intrusion of
British fishermen-trying to take advantage of the decision of the Court in

312

PACIFIC
ADIZ
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT ZONE
60-90 MILES
CUSTOMS WATERS-_ _

TERRITORIAL

WATERS-~MILES

12 MILES

_ _ _---:7'INLAND WATERS
(BAYS, HARBORS
LIQUOR TREATY ZONE --~----'<"~
(ONE HOUR SAILING)

Plate 1

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN
FISHERIES CASE

---BASE-LINE
--TERRITORIAL WATERS

Plate 2

a RIVERS)

313
the Norwegian case, has similarly
adopted the idea of base lines; but, here,
extending over rather wide indentations
of the coast-squaring off the coast, so
to speak-and then drawing their limit
of national waters within which fishery
is an Icelandic monopoly three miles
out from that base line. (See plate
three)
So we actually have, at the moment,
no complete agreement as to how this
line is to be measured in all cases. The
International Law Commission, again,
has approved the rule suggested in the
decision of the Court in the Norwegian
case.
The United States, in terms of our
basic rule of measuring the line three
miles from low-water mark, has preferred the method of measurement of
arcs and circles; that is, the intersecting
arcs of all circles drawn with the same
radius from all points of the base line.
The advantage of this is that a ship can
determine easily whether it is in territorial waters. If the ship is in the center,
you draw a circle of a given radius; if
the circle at any point touches the land,
you are within territorial waters-if not,
you are outside on the high seas. But

the International Court of Justice did
not admit that this method was established in international law.
As other minor points in the measurement question, each island has its
own territorial waters. The International
Law Commission has taken the position,
with some justification, that a lighthouse built on rocks-artificially built
up above high water-does not constitute an island with its own belt of
territorial waters. We are having to
consider now the problem of our radar
platforms off the American coast and
the oil-drilling platforms which are also
being set up on the high seas. As far as I
know, we are not making any claim that
those are islands which have their own
territorial waters around them. I will
refer later to the special problem that
arises there.
There is a similar argument in the
measurement of territorial waters in
bays, on which no general agreement
has been reached. An attempt has been
made to get a ten-mile rule; that is, if
the bay is not more than ten miles wide
at the mouth it is a territorial bay. The
International Law Commission has suggested, here, a twenty-five mile rule.
~)
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Then, again, there are "historic bays,"
so-called-bays like the Chesapeakewhere over a long period of time, a
country has asserted that these are
national waters, and where others have
consented.
So much for details on the question
of measurement. Let's go on to the
problem of what kind of jurisdiction a
state is entitled to exercise on the high
seas outside the territorial waters.
The general principle was laid down
by Chief Justice Marshall in a case as
long ago as 1804, where he said that a
state's power is not confined to its
territory and that it can protect itself by
exercising certain authority outside. If
what it does is reasonable, other states
will consent; if it is unreasonable, they
will object. This was an expression of a
general right of self-defense, but it has
become a rather classic statement in this
connection. We have acted on this since
the earliest days of our history by the
customs enforcement zone, which you
saw on that chart. We applied this
twelve miles out from shore but, under
our earlier legislation, only for ships
bound for the United States. In prohibition days, we included all shipswhether bound for our ports or not.
Foreign governments were objecting, so
we finally concluded treaties with a
large number of them providing that
ships could be seized if they were within
one hour's sail as measured by their own
speed or the speed of their small boats
from our coast. This was adopted because the British did not want to agree
on any mileage limit which might
weaken the three-mile principle. Then,
in 1935, we passed the Anti-Smuggling
Act, which authorizes the President in
certain cases to establish customs enforcement areas as much as sixty-two
miles off the coast.
A great many other countries have
similar laws providing for the enforcement of custom laws within an extended zone of the high seas-usually,
around twelve miles.

The United States has always emphasized the fact that our claim here is a
claim to certain jurisdiction on the high
seas for our protection, and that this is
not a claim to territorial waters. The
failure to understand that basie point,
and to accept it in other countries, has
been at the root of a great deal of the
trouble and of the disagreement.
Similarly, in time of war, countries
have set up special zones for their
protection under war conditions and for
the defense of neutrality. Your Law
Instructions for Naval Warfare point out
some of these cases. The most extreme
case is the Declaration of Panama in
1939, in which the Latin American
Republics joined with us in setting up a
zone which extended some three
hundred miles off the tip of South
America and some twelve hundred miles
off Florida. The belligerents did not
accept it, and it was never really enforced.
In 1945, the United States started a
movement which has had unexpected
repercussions. In that year, the President
issued two Executive Orders. The first
was an order on the continental shelf.
The continental shelf, of course, is the
sloping projection beyond the eoast,
which goes until it falls into the deep of
the sea. There have been old cases involving pearl fisheries, sponge fisheries, and
even coal mines extending out under the
bed of the sea. But it was only recently
that it was found that it was possible to
exploit petroleum resources by drilling in
the continental shelf, a considerable
number of miles out.
So we issued these decrees, or executive orders, and we said that every statc
had a right to exploit its natural resources in the continental shelf. We said
that these natural resources appertained
to the United States and were subject to
its jurisdiction and control. But we also
said that this was not a claim to
extending territorial waters; that the
waters on top are high seas, free to
navigation by all.
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That was followed immediately by
other states who misinterpreted our
proclamation. They said we had claimed
sovereignty over all the waters over the
continental shelf; therefore, they
claimed sovereignty. The Argentines
were the first to follow this, and it was
rapidly followed by a lot of Latin
American States. It has now been followed by states on the Persian Gulf,
where the geophysical formation is
quite different. You now have a welter
of claims based on this idea of the claim
to the continental shelf.
Here, thc International Law Commission has been trying to grapple with the
definition by setting the boundary according to the depth of the water on the
continental shelf. They have been talking about a depth of two hundred
meters, which would define the limits
within which you could exercise this
jurisdiction. We may note that the
Syngman Rhee Line, established by the
Korean Proclamation of 1952, specifically says their claim is irrespective of
the depth of the water. This is a very
real problem.
Our oil companies are now building
drilling platforms as much as thirty
miles out in the Gulf of Mexico. We
claim that they have a right to do that,
but we do not claim that as our territory. Other countries are going to bt
following suit in the Persian Gulf and
clsewhere, so you have opened up a vast
area here in which the rules still need to
be worked out in the international
community. But I think that the general
proposition of the right to exploit the
resources in the continental shelf is
firmly established-I think everybody
agrees to that. The difference is between
the claim to exercise a limited jurisdiction on what is still recognized to be
high seas, or under high seas, as against
the extreme Peruvian, Chilean and
Ecuadorian claims that the territory of
the states extends out two hundred
miles over this continental shelf.
There are various other special rights

in the adjacent seas, but I haven't time
to go into them in detail. I merely
mention particularly the right of hot
pursuit-where, if you begin pursuing a
ship in your territorial water, and follow
it out on the high seas, you may
complete the capture on the high seas.
Let me turn now to the question of
jurisdiction over ships; first, foreign
merchant ships in port. Here, there is
supposed to be a disagreement between
the Anglo-American theory and the
Continental Europe theory. Our theory
is that when a foreign merchant ship
comes into one of our ports it is
completely subject to our jurisdiction.
But, we say we will not bother to
exercise that jurisdiction in minor matters, such as disciplinary measures taken
by the captain in the case of the crew.
On the other hand the Continental
theory has said the ships are immune,
but the local state may exercise jurisdiction if the peace of the port is affected,
or if the act affects the persons on shore
or on another ship, or if the captain of
the ship asks for help.
Practically, the result is the -same in
most cases. But it seems to me thatthe
American theory of complete jurisdiction over a foreign merchant ship in
port is sound in international law. You
will also find that many treaties have
been concluded to allow the local consular officers to take jurisdiction over
wage disputes among the crew, for
example. However, as I have noted, you
do have concurrent jurisdiction in cases
where events take place on a foreign
merchant ship in port-the local state
where the p'ort is 1geated has jurisdiction, and so has the state of the ship in
question. In these cases the warship, as I
have noted, is immune from local jurisdiction.
As you get out from a port itself into
the territorial waters the interest of
local state is less, but this is the territory
of the state-and the state is still entitled to exercise its jurisdiction. The
International Law Commission has
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suggested some limitation there in line
with the traditional European theory
about the peace of the port and the
effect on other ships or persons.
There is one particular right which
we ought to note in connection with
ships in territorial waters, and that is the
right of innocent passage. Traditionally,
I think it has always been thought of as
the case of a ship sailing from State A to
State B, which, in the course of normal
navigation, passes through the waters of
State C. This old right to pass in the
normal channels of navigation has been
recognized in international law. The
coastal state cannot deny this right of
innocent passage-that is clear. The only
question is this: What authority may the
state exercise over a ship in course of
innocent passage? I think that the International Law Commission in its suggestions goes rather far in authorizing this
jurisdiction over these vessels. It seems
to me that the sound rule is to leave
them as free as possible, and for the
local state to exercise jurisdiction only
where its interests are really vitally
effected.
Another question in connection with
innocent passage is whether a warship
has the right to exercise innocent
passage. The old American rule, as
stated by Secretary of State Elihu Root,
was the "merchant ships may pass because they do not threaten; warships
may not pass because they do
threaten." The International Law Commission, however, says that warships do
have a right of innocent passage. The
question came up in the International
Court in the Corfu Channel case, but
the Court confined itself to saying that
warships have the right of passage
through an international strait, and did
not pass on the British claim that they
had a general right of innocent passage.
In connection with maritime law, I
want to deal with one particular set of
problems which is important now on
the high seas. We have noted that,
generally, a state has jurisdiction over its

ships and it has jurisdiction in its contiguous waters for its own protection;
that in general there is no authority over
a foreign ship on the high seas except in
cases of piracy or under special treaties.
We have recently found that this issue
has involved the question of a real
authority exercised by the United States
over large areas of the high seas.
For instance, in 1950 we made an
agreement with Great Britain for the
Bahamas Long-Range Proving Ground
for the testing of guided missiles. The
launching area is in Florida and the
zone, as defined in the treaty, goes
southeast through the Bahamas down to
a point opposite Haiti. The agreement
elaborately provides, in regard to the
rights of the United States in the use of
it, that the United States agrees to
compensate those who are injured
through its use of the zone. It says that
it will not unreasonably exercise its
rights so as to interfere with, or prejudice, safety of navigation, aviation, or
eommunication within the flight-testing
range. This has been in existence now
for five years, and was amplified somewhat by an agreement in 1953. So far as
I know, no foreign state has objected.
Then came the question of the
Proving Grounds for atomic bombs,
and, later, for hydrogen bombs in the
Pacifie. In your readings there is a
suggestion of an interesting spirited defense of the right of the United States
here by MeDougal and Schlei in the
Yale Law Journal. As they point out,
the first tests here were conducted in
1946-and 180,000 square miles of seas
with islands in them were defined as an
area that people had to keep out of
because it was a danger zone. The area
has varied in the warnings issued since
that time until, in the test of the
H-bomb in March, 1954, the warning
area covered 400,000 square miles.
It is to be noted that alI of the orders
were withdrawn after fifty-seven days;
in other words, we were not permanently closing this area. It is also to be
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noted that there are not main navigation
routes through this area, nor is there
any particular fishery of importance
within the area. Nevertheless, as you
know, through certain miscalculations
in the fall-out and in the winds, Japanese fishermen (in one vessel in particular) suffered from radioactive effects,
the fish were alleged to be affected, and
the United States paid two million
dollars to Japan-not with any admission of liability, but in order to settle it.
Comparable to our claim is the
Australian Proclamation of 1953, which
set up a prohibited area of 6,000 square
miles surrounding the Monte Bello
Islands. I noticed in The New York
Times this morning that further tests are
to be carried out there.
These claims of controlling people on
the high seas are very extensive and
there are very few precedents for them.
It seems to me that McDougal is right in
stressing the element of reasonableness
and going back to the old test which
Marshall advanced in another connection in 1804. I do not think that you
can generalize about them-you have
got to study the particular situation;
then test it on the ground of reasonableness, the interests of the country
utilizing this area, and the interests of
others adversely affected thereby.
Finally, one or two moments on the
question of jurisdiction in air space.
Prior to 1914, there was little governmental interest in this; it was largely left
to scholars. They had a lovely time
speculating about who owned the air
space. They finally came out, by
analogy to the high seas, by saying: "Of
course the air is free, but everybody has
a bclt of territorial space. This belt is as
much as you need for protection. All
you need is the height of your highest
building. "
At the time these talks went on the
Eiffel Tower was the tallest building, so
they took that height. They said that
everybody could build or control the air
spaces as high above the ground as the

Eiffel Tower. Above that, the air was
free. World War I changed all of that
with the development of the use of
aircraft. Immediately after the end of
the war all the states, with remarkable
unanimity and speed, agreed that every
state is sovereign over its air space, and,
as the phrase went, "up to the skies."
Nobody stopped or bothered at that
time to define where the skies ended or
where they began.
Nowadays, we are getting into more
discussion of the ionosphere, and people
are beginning to worry about jurisdiction over satellites floating around the
earth. All that I can say is: if you find
yourself in command of a satellite in the
ionosphere and you encounter a Soviet
satellite, you had better send back for
instructions because the law books will
not help you any.
You will find, in general, that air law
has developed by analogy from the
maritime law. For instance: just as you
have the principle of the nationality of
ships in jurisdiction over ships, you have
nationality of aircraft. On the other
hand, the principle of innocent passage,
which developed in maritime law for
rather clear reasons, was denied in connection with air law-that is not established, so that the right of entry, landing, or overflight depends entirely upon
treaties. I think that one can say, as
Professor Lissitzyn argues, that there is
a right of entry in distress, as argued by
the United States in our claims against
Yugoslavia when they shot down American planes. Perhaps we find another
example in the recent Bulgarian incident
in the shooting down of the Israeli
craft-although that may have been
merely a confession of error.
This air space, then, is now generally
conceived to be part of the territory of
the state just as much as the land or the
territorial waters; it extends up above
the territory and it extends above the
territorial waters. But, just as in the case
of territorial waters and further jurisdiction on the high seas, so we find that
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states are asserting jurisdiction in the air
space adjacent to their boundaries but
out over the high seas. The United
States and Canada have met this by the
Proclamation of the A.D.LZ., (the Air
Defense Identification Zones). You will
remember that on the slide of the U.S.
coast there was a far line a way out. Our
A.D.I.Z. line extends some hundreds of
miles off our coast in some places, and
the Canadian line is somewhat closer.
All aircraft entering these zones· are
required to report and to comply with
certain rules and instructions, but we do
not forbid foreign aircraft to fly into
these zones. The C.A.A. has stated in a
letter that foreign aircraft bound, for
example, from Havana to Halifax, not
approaching the United States, do not
need to comply with the regulations in
the zone. But, query whether we would
tolerate Soviet military aircraft flying
within ten or twelve miles of our coastalthough we would admit they are
flying over the high seas. We insist that
our airmen have the right to fly up to
within three miles of the Soviet coast,

although as a practical matter we tell
them to keep twelve miles out Is this a
situation where the United States, as a
great air power following its tradition of
the narrow belt of territorial waters, is
also seeking to establish the rule of the
narrow belt of air space over territorial
waters, and a limited right of authority
in air space out over the high seas? I
suggest that this is a problem which
needs· very serious consideration in the
American Government: as to whether
the interests of the United States are
still to be promoted by an insistence on
the three-mile rule of territorial waters
and by insistence on very restricted
rights in the super-adjacent air space
over the high seas off our maritime
frontiers.
I think that one will find that with
the increased compactness of the world,
the speed of communication, and the
rapidity with which these problems are
advancing, the development of the law
in these respects will probably be
more rapid in the future than in the
past.
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